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Dr Matas makes a persuasive case for launching a pilot trial 
of incentives to increase the supply of kidneys for transplan-
tation. Ms Adair and Professor Wigmore, on the other hand, 
urge continued reliance on altruism: ‘In the setting of paid 
donation,’ they write, ‘informed consent is often of dubi-
ous quality with the risks of surgery often not being properly 
explained or understood.’ Unacceptable? Of course but let 
us be clear here. The fact that donors are enriched is not the 
problem. The problem is that such cash-for-kidney exchanges 
are conducted illegally. This is the source of the danger and 
degradation that Adair and Wigmore describe so well.
All ethical people deplore exploitation of the poor but unless 
the supply of organs is increased, trafficking will continue to 
flourish. Markets will be driven further underground – making 
it all the more hazardous for donors and patients alike – or 
they will simply move to another region as we have seen hap-
pen over the past few years. Even if global trafficking could 
somehow be eradicated, we confront the tragic trade-off of an 
even higher death toll from renal failure. The only solution is 
to incentivise donation under conditions that are medically 
and morally scrupulous.
Hence Matas’s call for a trial of incentives with safeguards for 
donor health and carefully obtained, informed consent at its 
core. In his proposal, for example, trials would operate only in 
countries that could provide appropriate oversight of govern-
ment-sponsored material incentives. To ensure transplanta-
tion for all patients, the kidney would be allocated to the first 
person on the waiting list (similar to allocation for deceased 
donor kidneys). Donor and patient would have limited, if any, 
access to one another. In the end everyone benefits, not just 
the well-off. This is the precise opposite of the rapacious 
organ trade.
Unless desperate patients can receive new kidneys they will 
continue to haunt the shady organ bazaars that thrive on the 
vulnerability of impoverished donors. Adair and Wigmore, 
though claiming to disagree with Matas’s proposal, inadvert-
ently provide powerful rationale to support it.
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The major reason to consider incentives for living kidney 
donation is that transplant candidates are suffering and dy-
ing while waiting for a transplant. The shortage of organs 
has become a major crisis in almost all countries that do 
transplants (the exception is Iran, which has a donor in-
centive programme). For patients with end-stage kidney 
disease, a transplant provides significantly longer survival 
and significantly better quality of life than dialysis.1,2 In ad-
dition, the longer candidates wait on dialysis, the worse the 
transplant results.3 Therefore early transplantation confers 
important advantages.
as transplant results have improved over the last three 
decades, more patients with end-stage kidney disease 
have opted for a transplant; yet there has not been a com-
mensurate increase in the number of available organs.4,5 
as a consequence, the number of people on the waiting 
list, the time from listing to transplant, and the mortality 
while waiting continue to increase. In the 1980s a newly 
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listed candidate in the US could expect to wait about one 
year for a transplant; currently, the wait is more than five 
years (and in some areas of the country is approaching 
ten years). Between 2000 and 2009, over 69,000 waiting-
listed candidates in the US were removed from the list 
because they died or became too sick to transplant.4 Can-
didates over 60 years of age and newly added to the list 
have a greater chance of dying while waiting than of be-
ing transplanted.6 Incentives may increase donation and 
save lives.
at the same time, many potential (altruistic) donors do 
not come forward because of the ‘costs’ associated with the 
evaluation and donation:
1. risk of dying and having no life insurance;
2. concerns about long-term healthcare and (in the US) 
having no health insurance;
3. lost ‘wages’ while out of work for the surgery and recov-
ery; and
4. costs of travel to the transplant centre for the evaluation 
and the surgery.
Removal of these disincentives would allow more donors to 
come forward.
There is another reason to consider a regulated system of 
incentives. Currently, transplant tourism and ‘unregulated’ 
free markets exist throughout the world.7 only the wealthy 
receive kidneys in these markets. at the same time there is 
little oversight of the donor evaluation, no long-term donor 
follow-up and no protection for either the donor (who often 
does not receive what was promised) or the recipient. De-
veloping a regulated system of incentives may decrease the 
waiting list and minimise or eliminate these unregulated 
markets.
Incentives could also be considered for deceased dona-
tion. But the major reason to focus on living donation is 
that if all potential deceased donors became actual donors 
(in the US) there would still be an organ shortage.8 In ad-
dition, with deceased donation it is difficult to determine 
who would receive the incentive or what happens if family 
members disagree.
The concept of incentives for donation is controversial, 
so definitions are critical. I support a very specific system in 
which there is either no or very limited contact between do-
nor and recipient.9,10 The government (or designee) would 
provide the incentive to the donor and the kidney would be 
1) Arguments that do not distinguish between donation and compensation
a) The compensated donor would be harmed.
b) Genuine consent would be impossible.
c) Not enough is known about long-term risk to donors.
2) Arguments with no supporting data
a) Conventional donation would decrease.
b) Donation should be altruistic.
c) Trust in the government or in doctors would erode.
3) Arguments that are not logical
a) Unregulated systems have failed elsewhere.
b) Congress and various professional societies have already voted to prohibit compensation, so we should end the discussion.
c) The sale of blood has failed.
d) Organised religions would object.
e) Financial incentives would constitute coercion.
f) A regulated system would be abused.
g) We should do more preventive medicine.
h) Other current initiatives are working.
i) A regulated system would be similar to slavery or prostitution.
j) Once we start, we cannot return to altruistic donation.
k) Other countries would continue or initiate unregulated systems.
4) Arguments that equate compensation with wrongful commodification of the body
5) Arguments that compensation would lead to exploitation of the poor
TABLE 1 Misleading arguments used against a regulated system of compensated donation
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allocated to the first person on the waiting list (similar to 
allocation for deceased donor kidneys) so that all candidates 
on the list would have the opportunity to be transplanted.
The donor evaluation would be done (similar to our 
current donors) by a panel, including a surgeon, neph-
rologist, social worker, coordinator and advocate, each of 
whom would be concerned that the donor understood the 
risks associated with the procedure. only citizens and legal 
residents would be considered as donors so as to ensure 
long-term healthcare and follow-up. Because the system 
would be government-based there would be appropriate 
regulation and oversight – ie, this is not a free market. I 
believe that trials of incentives should only be developed in 
countries that can provide the appropriate oversight. Impor-
tantly, because dialysis is so much more expensive than a 
transplant, a programme of incentives for donation could be 
cost-neutral to the healthcare system.
Different trials could provide different options for incen-
tives. at the very minimum, disincentives should be elimi-
nated. In addition, there could be a tax credit, college tuition, 
a direct payment, or a small direct payment with additional 
small payments at each follow-up visit (which would both 
minimise the risk of candidates donating for ‘quick cash’ 
and help ensure long-term follow-up). Different incentives 
may appeal to different candidates.
Numerous arguments have been proposed against a 
regulated system of incentives; on detailed analyses each 
fails.9,11–15 These arguments can be divided into five major 
categories (Table 1).
1. Some arguments (eg potential risk to the donor) ignore 
the fact that the risks would be the same as for our cur-
rent donors. We accept living donation; therefore, to be 
successful, arguments must differentiate incentivised 
donation from our current donation.
2. Some arguments (eg donation will decrease) can only 
be answered by a trial. It is naive to believe that there is 
a dichotomy between ‘altruistic’ donation and ‘incentiv-
ised’ donation. Many of our current so-called ‘altruistic’ 
donors have numerous additional motives and many 
who come forward because of incentives (or elimination 
of disincentives) will also have altruistic motives.
3. Some arguments are totally illogical (eg unregulated 
markets have failed elsewhere) or used as ‘scare tactics’ 
(eg the sale of blood failed; people will be coerced).
4. Arguments that incentives will lead to commodification 
of the human body ignore the fact that we already com-
pensate people for sperm, ova, surrogate motherhood 
and, in court cases for loss of body parts, without any 
loss of humanity.
Arguments that the poor will be exploited ignore a funda-
mental tenet of Western society – that people be allowed to 
control their own destiny. a fully informed individual should 
be free to decide whether or not the benefits outweigh the 
risks. Nevertheless, sensitivity to this concern should dic-
tate careful development of trials and appropriate oversight. 
Donors are heroes; there is nothing inherently wrong with 
rewarding heroes.
Many argue that we should not consider incentives until 
other possible initiatives have been tried. But the reality is 
that in the last decade – with the introduction of expanded 
criteria donors, donation after cardiac death, non-directed 
donors, paired exchanges and increased public education – 
there has not been any significant increase in the number of 
transplants.4 If we wait years to see if continuing these ini-
tiatives work, the list (and waiting time) will only get longer. 
others argue that if a trial failed we could not revert to the 
current system but we could develop a limited trial with a 
planned one-year moratorium to evaluate results.
Aside from the ‘ethical’ concerns, there are also practi-
cal issues that would have to be addressed. For example, 
should there be a minimum age? Who would administer the 
programme?
at the end of the day, we need to decide whether to 
support the status quo that has led to the organ shortage 
(and to our patients suffering and dying while waiting for 
a transplant) or to initiate trials of incentives in order to in-
crease donation (recognising and addressing the concerns). 
Establishment of a regulated system of incentives has the 
potential of saving lives and shortening the waiting list, 
while simultaneously protecting the health and dignity of 
donors. It is time to lift the ban against incentives and initi-
ate clinical trials to determine whether these possibilities 
can be achieved.
References
1.  Wolfe RA, Ashby VB, Milford EL et al. Comparison of mortality in all patients on 
dialysis, patients on dialysis awaiting transplantation, and recipients of a first 
cadaveric transplant. N Engl J Med 1999; 341: 1,725–730.
2.  Evans RW, Manninen DL, Garrison LP Jr et al. The quality of life of patients 
with end-stage renal disease. N Engl J Med 1985; 312: 553–559.
3.  Cosio FG, Alamir A, Yim S et al. Patient survival after renal transplantation:
I. The impact of dialysis pre-transplant. Kidney Int 1998; 53: 767–772.
4.  US Department of Health and Human Services. Health Resources and Services 
Administration. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ (cited May 2010).
5.  NHS Blood and Transplant. Organ Donation and Transplantation Directorate. 
http://www.uktransplant.org.uk/ (cited May 2010).
6.  Schold J, Srinivas TR, Sehgal AR, Meier-Kriesche HU. Half of kidney transplant 
candidates who are older than 60 years now placed on the waiting list will die 
before receiving a deceased-donor transplant. Clin J Am Soc Nephrol 2009;
7: 1,239–245.
7.  Schiano TD, Rhodes R. Transplant tourism. Curr Opin Organ Transplant 2010; 
15: 245–248.
8.  Sheehy E, Conrad SL, Brigham LE et al. Estimating the number of potential 
organ donors in the United States. N Engl J Med 2003; 349: 667–674.
9.  Matas AJ. The case for living kidney sales: rationale, objections and concerns. 
Am J Transplant 2004; 4: 2,007–17.
10.  Matas AJ. Design of a regulated system of compensation for living kidney 
donors. Clin Transplant 2008; 22: 378–384.
11.  Richards JR. Nefarious goings on. Kidney sales and moral arguments. J Med 
Philos 1996; 21: 375–416.
12.  Harris J, Erin C. An ethically defensible market in organs. BMJ 2002; 325: 
114–115.
13.  Gill MB, Sade RM. Paying for kidneys: the case against prohibition. Kennedy 
Inst Ethics J 2002; 12: 17–45.
14.  de Castro LD. Commodification and exploitation: arguments in favour of 
compensated organ donation. J Med Ethics 2003; 29: 142–146.
15.  Hippen BE. In defense of a regulated market in kidneys from living vendors. 
J Med Philos 2005; 30: 593–626.
Ann R Coll Surg Engl 2011; 93: 188–192
